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Non-interactive fuzzy private matching
Abstract. Two fuzzy private matching protocols are introduced to allow a client
to securely compare a list of words to a server list, and discover only those words
on the server list that are similar to his, while the server learns nothing. The
first protocol achieves perfect client security, while the second achieves almost-
privacy and perfect server security. Both protocols are efficient in both commu-
nication and computation complexity: for lists of length n, only O(n) communi-
cation and O(n2) computation is needed.
1 Introduction
In our current information society, large amounts of data are being accumulated.
Naturally, there is interaction between parties having different data. A common
problem is that two parties want to find out whether they share certain data. How-
ever, neither is really willing to reveal all his data to the other. For example, one
can think of cooperative data mining, where two competitors want to cooperate
in discovering market trends from their sales data - without revealing that data
to the competitor. Other examples include online dating, peer to peer services,
recommendation services, electronic health records, and so on. In practice, this
problem is often solved by using a trusted third party, or by one party sending
(part of) his data first regardless of any objections.
Both parties, called the client and the server, will be assumed to have a list of
words. The problem now is to design a secure protocol, by which the client
learns which of his words are also on the servers list, but which does not pro-
vide the server with any information about the clients list. Private matching was
introduced to solve this problem securely without the use of a third party [1]. For
practical cases, one often wishes to find out not only which words match exactly,
but also the near matches - think of situations like misspellings and tastes which
are never exactly equal. This problem is called fuzzy private matching, and it
was left open by Freedman et al. [1] to design an efficient protocol that achieves
this. This work will present two efficient protocols that achieve this goal in the
semi-honest model.
2 Background
The root of the considered problem lies in private equality testing [2,3,4], or PET,
where the client and the server each hold a single word and want to securely
decide whether their words are equal. Assuming a word consisting of T symbols,
the solution runs in complexity O(T ).
Freedman et al. [1] consider lists instead of single words. They develop protocols
for private matching. Another natural direction to extend the problem is to look
at similarity instead of equality - what if only t out of T symbols (“letters”) of
a word have to be equal? Private approximation of functions was formalized by
Feigenbaum et al. [5]. In particular, they left open the question whether there are
efficient protocols achieving private similarity testing. Indyk and Woodruff [6]
answer this question positively.
Combining both these extensions, one arrives at fuzzy private matching. Freed-
man et al. gave a first protocol with communication complexity O(n
`
T
t
´
), and
posed the question whether the same could be achieved without the
`
T
t
´
factor.
Indyk and Woodruff [6] give a construction with O˜(nT + n2) communication.
Chmielewski and Hoepman [7] achieve O(nT ) communication by moving the
binomial factor to the computation complexity, which is O(n2
`
T
t
´
) in their best
protocol.
Here two solutions will be presented which eliminate the binomial factor, and
have communication complexity O(nT ), and computation complexity O(n2).
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Notation and problem definition
Assume that the words xi to be matched have length T and symbols from a field
F: xi ∈ FT . The server will have a list LS = {y1, . . . , ynS} of nS words, while
the clients list LC = {x1, . . . , xnC} consists of nC words. The goal is to design
a protocol that allows the client to discover words on the server list that are similar
to his. To be more precise, the client should learn the set
R = {yi | ∃j, d(yi, xj) ≤ T − t},
where d denotes Hamming distance (i.e. t out of T symbols of the word should
match).
Definition 1. A t-out-of-T (hC , hS) fuzzy private matching scheme is a protocol
between the client and the server which outputs the set R of those server words
to the client, which match on at least t symbols with one of the clients words.
For each (non-matched) server word, the entropy loss is at most hS , and for each
client word the entropy loss is at most hC .
Here, entropy loss is measured asH∞(W )−H˜∞(W |FPM), whereW is the dis-
tributions of words, and H˜∞ is the average min-entropy [8] left after the protocol
FPM has run.
Note that the privacy requirements are somewhat relaxed - in the literature [1,6,7]
only (0, 0) fuzzy private matching schemes are considered.
3.2 Secure sketches
Secure sketches were introduced as a kind of secure error-correcting code [8]. In
particular, a secure sketch produces public information about its inputw that does
not reveal w, and yet it allows exact recovery of w given a value that is close to
w. To be more precise we quote Dodis et al.:
Definition 2 ([8]). An (M,m, m˜, t)-secure sketch is a pair of randomized pro-
cedures, “Sketch” (SS) and “Recover” (Rec), with the following properties:
1. The sketching procedure on input w ∈M returns a bit string s ∈ {0, 1}?.
2. The recovery procedure takes an element w′ ∈ M and a bit string s ∈
{0, 1}?. The correctness property of the secure sketch guarantees that if
d(w,w′) ≤ t, then Rec(w′, SS(w)) = w.
3. The security property guarantees that H˜∞(W |SS(W )) ≥ m˜ for any dis-
tributionW overM with min-entropym. In other words, an adversary who
observes s can recover the input w with a probability at most 2−m˜.
Note that this definition is adapted for Hamming distance d, and Dodis et al. also
considered secure sketches for other similarity metrics. Here we will focus on the
Hamming distance constructions, since this most closely matches our problem.
Constructing a secure sketch from MDS codes. As shown in the
literature [9,8], error-correcting codes can be used to construct secure sketches.
Similar to those constructions, an [n, k, d]MDS code C (so k = n− d+ 1) can
be used to construct a (Fk,m,m − (n − k)f, d−1
2
) secure sketch as follows.
Given w ∈ Fk, calculate the unique tail e such that (w||e) ∈ C (here || stands
for concatenation). Since any k symbols in an MDS code can be used as the
information symbols [10], such an e always exists and is unique. Recovery is
done by decoding (w′||e), and will succeed if d(w||e, w′||e) = d(w,w′) ≤ d−1
2
.
In particular, if we use a (generalised) Reed-Solomon code, for which efficient
decoding algorithms are known (e.g. using the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm),
we arrive at an efficient and deterministic sketch with small output size.
3.3 Adversary model
In this work, we assume a semi-honest adversary [11]. Informally, this means
that both parties are expected to follow the protocol. As a measure for the secu-
rity (both of the client and the server), we will take the entropy loss [8] defined
as h = H∞(W ) − H˜∞(W |FPM), which measures how much information an
eavesdropping adversary gains after the protocolFPM is run. Note that this infor-
mation need not be deterministic. For instance, in the secure sketch construction
above, the entropy loss is (n − k) log2 q. This means that out of qk, there are
still q2k−n possibilities left for w, since there are exactly that many codewords
ending in the given tail e.
4 Non-interactive Fuzzy Private Matching
In this section, a low-complexity - both in terms of communication and compu-
tation - protocol for private fuzzy matching will be introduced, based on secure
sketches. There will be both a basic version, achieving perfect client security, as
well as an interactive version, which achieves perfect server security.
4.1 Basic Protocol
The basic non-interactive protocol consists of three phases. Firstly, the server
performs the setup. Then the server publishes information about his list. lastly,
the client can use this information to discover which of his words are similar.
Setup Phase. In the setup phase, the server fixes an [n, k, d] q-ary MDS code C
with n = 3T − 2t, k = T and d = 2T − 2t + 1. The server also publishes a
decoding algorithm D for C which can efficiently correct d−1
2
= T − t errors.
Note that such an efficiently decodable code exists [10], as long as q is chosen
such that n ≤ q (take for example a generalized Reed-Solomon code).
Also, the server fixes an appropiate, publicly known, semantically secure encryp-
tion scheme (Enc,Dec).
Server operations. For each word yi in the server listLS , the server finds ei such
that ci = yi||ei ∈ C (here || stands for concatenation). Since yi consists of k = T
coordinates and C is an MDS code, there is a unique codeword that starts with
these coordinates. Let ki = D(ci). The server publishes the pair (ei,Encki(yi)).
All in all, the server publishes a list of pairs {(ei,Encki(yi))|1 ≤ i ≤ nS}.
Client operations. In order to find out whether a word xi on the client list LC
matches a published pair (e, c), the client performs the following operations.
Firstly, the client applies the decoding algorithm D to obtain k = D(xi||e). If
the decoding algorithm fails, xi doesn’t match that server word. Otherwise, the
client continues by trying to decrypt c with the obtained k to find y = Deck(c).
If the decryption is succesful, the word xi matches y on the server list, and the
client has retireved y.
The client will try to match each pair of the published server list to words in his
own list LC , until he either finds a succesful match or he has exhausted his own
list.
4.2 Protocol analysis
In this section, the correctness, communication and computational complexity,
and the security of the basic protocol will be discussed. The basic protocol will
turn out to be a t-out-of-T (0, 2f(T − t)) fuzzy private matching scheme.
Correctness. First of all, assume the client has a word x matching the server
pair (ei,Encki(yi)). Since x matches the pair, the following Hamming weight
can be bounded d(x||ei, yi||ei) = d(x, yi) ≤ T − t, and thus D is able to
efficiently decode and reconstruct ki. Using this key, the client is able to find the
original server word yi.
On the other hand, if the server pair doesn’t match the client word, we have that
d(x||ei, yi||ei) > T − t, which means that one will not find ki using D. The
decoding algorithm will either abort, or return a key which is of no use to decrypt
yi.
Complexity. The communication complexity of this protocol is only nS(3T−
2t) symbols. This is the same order of magnitude as the best known results
from the literature [7]. However, the clients time complexity is only O(nSnC),
which substantially improves upon the time complexity ofO(nSnC
`
T
t
´
) [7]. The
servers time complexity is O(nS).
Security. Since the basic protocol is a non-interactive scheme, the client list
remains perfectly secure - the server never gets any information about it.
To analyze the security of the server list, we first remark that for each word, the
first part published by the server is the secure sketch discussed in Section 3.2.
In fact, this is an (FT , T (1 − δ)f, 2tf − T (1 + δ)f, T − t) secure sketch [8,
Theorem 5.1] for any 0 ≤ δ < 1, where f = log2(q). To show this claim,
assume that the words on the server list are drawn from a distribution with min-
entropy H∞(Y ) = T (1 − δ)f . Then the average min-entropy given the sketch
E is H˜∞(Y |E) = 2tf − T (1 + δ)f , since C is a q-ary MDS code.
This shows that publishing e inevitably leaks information about y. In particular,
we need t > (1+δ)T
2
in order to have any min-entropy left. Hence, this approach
is best suited for fuzzy private matching with t ≈ T .
4.3 Interactive Protocol
The basic protocol achieves perfect client security. However, the server security
is only computational. In fact, the server essentially publishes n− k = 2T − 2t
symbols of each of his words. Also, the server has no control over the length
of the client list - which allows the client to perform a brute-force attack on the
published server list.
In order to remedy these problems, the protocol can be reversed. Pick a suitable
collision-resistant hash function h. For each word in the client list, the following
protocol is executed:
1. Assume the client word is x. The client calculates e such that c = (x||e) ∈
C. For the same reasons as in the basic protocol, there is a unique codeword
that starts with these coordinates. Let k = D(c). The client sends the pair
(e, h(k)) to the server.
2. For each word yi in the server list, the server decodes yi||e using the ef-
ficient decoding algorithm D. If decoding succeeds, the server calculates
h(D(yi||e)) and compares it to the hash value sent by the client. If these are
equal, the server word matches the client word, and the server sends yi to the
client, encrypted with the users key.
This interactive protocol is perfectly secure for the server. However, this comes at
a price. First of all, now the clients security is only computational - by the same
arguments, the client publishes information about his words (in fact, the entropy
loss is equal to the non-interactive case). Moreover, since the server now has to
do the decoding, the computational complexity shifts to the server, which may
be undesirable. Lastly, perhaps most importantly, this protocol does not achieve
the exact goals we set out at the start - the server will learn which of its words
match the clients list. Unfortunately, this seems to be unavoidable when perfect
server security is desired with small communication complexity (i.e. less than
nCnS), since the server can always run his part of the protocol twice (or more)
with adjusted server lists - it seems there is not enough communication possible
for the client to exert control over how often his data is used. Thus the interactive
protocol is a t-out-of-T (2f(T − t), 0) fuzzy almost-private matching scheme.
4.4 Protocol enhancements
In this section some enhancements to the protocol will be introduced. While they
are written from the perspective of the basic protocol, the enhancements apply to
the interactive version as well.
Keylength. The basic protocol assumes an encryption scheme with a keylength
of Tf bits. In particular, this means that T must be large enough to not allow for
a brute-force attack on Encki(yi). Moreover, in practice, such a scheme might
be hard to find, especially if one wants to conform to standards (like AES).
Assume that one wants to use an encryption scheme which has a keylength of
l = (T + τ)f bits. For simplicity we will consider the case where f is a divisor
of l (in the general case, if we discard a few bits the extra entropy loss will be
small). To arrive at an l-bit key, the server should select an [3T − 2t + τ, T +
τ, 2T − 2t+1]MDS code C in the setup phase. Then for each server word yi the
server generates a string ti of τ random symbols, and constructs the codeword
ci = (yi||ti||ei). Instead of publishing ei, the server will publish (ti||ei). Note
that this construction does not modify the resulting min-entropy of the protocol
- it allows one to use a standard encryption scheme, and prevents brute-force
attacks when T is too small.
Introducing user dependence. The biggest weakness of the non-interactive
protocol is that the server has no control over the client. In particular, the client
(or anyone who has access to the published server list) can keep trying to find
a match until he can successfully decrypt the server word. In order to limit this
somewhat, the server may choose to adapt the protocol slightly and encrypt each
ei with the users key (for this we have to assume either a public key, or a shared
secret key). This protects the server against eavesdropping on the list – the server
inherently has no control over the clients list.
Using list decoding. Recent developments in coding theory [12,13] allow
one to (list) decode beyond the traditional d−1
2
bound. For (generalised) Reed-
Solomon codes, it is possible to decode up to e = n − √kn errors (which is
strictly larger than d−1
2
) in about O˜(n12) time [13, Theorem 6.16]. It is still an
open problem whether this is the best possible result for specific codes, like the
generalized Reed-Solomon codes used here.
These results could be used by a client in the basic protocol to correct more errors
than anticipated, resulting in the ability to match words that are (slightly) further
apart. However, we can also use these results positively: if we can efficiently
perform Sudan’s algorithm [12], the protocol only needs a code C’ that can list
decode up to e = T − t errors. This will lead to a smaller length of the used code.
5 Conclusions
Two protocols for t-out-of-T fuzzy private matching were constructed using se-
cure sketches based on MDS codes for 2t > T . Both run in small communication
complexity, as well as low computation complexity. The first, basic protocol is a
(0, 2f(T − t)) fuzzy private matching scheme, or in other words it achieves per-
fect client security, and computational (exponential in t) server security in a non-
interactive fashion. The second, interactive protocol enjoys perfect server security
and computational client security, i.e. it is a (2f(T − t), 0) fuzzy almost-private
matching scheme. However, in the last scheme the server learns which words
from his list are similar to the clients list.
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